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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BENJAMIN HAMPTON 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
MARION H. ROWLEY and 
NORMA RO\VLEY, his wife, 
dba ROWLEY BUILDERS 
SUPPLY 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 9050 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND 
RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises out of an ac'tion for persona'! 
injury brought by Benjamin Hampton against 
Marion H. Rowley and Norma Rowley dba Rowley 
Builders Supply. Mr. Hampton fell while carrying 
a bag of cement down the steps in front of a build· 
ing at defendants' place of busine~s. the fall alleg-
edly resulting from a rock on the step. ( R. 1, 2, 3). 
The case was 'tried and the jury returned a verdict 
in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff, 
No Cause of Action. (R. 137, 138). It' is from the 
Judgment on the Verdict that this appea'l is taken. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff gives a short statement of fact in his 
brief, but we are not in accord with the facts as set 
forth, and plaintiff failed to give all the pertinent 
facts. 
Saturday, March 29, 1958, at approximately 
1:15 P.M., the plaintiff was 'trying to locate a hard-
ware store that was open, so he could purchase some 
cement. He drove tD the defendants' place of busi-
ness at 4300 South 9th East Street, and it was 
closed, it being Saturday afternoon. (R. 6-33-34). 
Defendants' place of business consists of two Army 
type barracks buildings located on the west side 
of 9th East, the buildings being separated by a 
driveway leading intD the business supply yard. The 
south building was not being used in the business, 
and it had been remodeled into an apartment in 
the front, and was occupied by Mr. Rowley's father, 
Wilford Rowley, a gentleman 76 years of age, who 
was retired and a widower. (R. 17-23~24~28). The 
defendant, Marion Rowley provided his father with 
the apartment, and Mr. Wilford Rowley was not 
employed and did not work for his son, having quit 
work about one and one half years previously, and 
he had a heart condition that restricted his activity. 
(R. 28-30-31). 
The plaintiff went up the steps to the front 
door of the south building, and found it locked. 
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He had observed Mr. Wilford Rowley moving the 
curtains, and knocked at the door, and Mr. Row-
ley Sr., answered the door. (R. 63). Plaintiff was 
told the place of business was closed, but he wanted 
some cement, and Mr. Rowley Sr., told him he could 
get some cement but there was no one there who 
could carry it out, and plaintiff was told he would 
have to carry the cement out himself. (.R 35, 34-
61, 62, 63). The cement was available by going 
through the south building to some storage boxcars 
in the rear. Plaintiff carried one bag of cement to 
his trailer, went back and got a second bag, and feU 
while descending the steps with the second sack. 
{R. 36). After the faliJ he rested five or 'ten minutes 
then went back and got the third sack of cement, 
loaded it on his trailer, went home, mixed the ce-
ment, went out and got more gravel, and then had 
to quit work on the job he was doing because of the 
ankle swelling and paining. (R. 40). 
The defendants' place of business is located 
about 22 feet west of the west line of 9th East 
Street. (R. 13). There is a graveled shoulder on 9th 
East Street and defendants had gmveled the area 
in front of their place of business tD keep it from 
getting muddy. (R.19-20). 
In front of the south building there was a con-
crete apron about four feet in width, out from the 
bottom step of two steps leading into the bui1ding. 
The first step was three inches above the concrete 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
apron, and the second step was six inches above the 
first step, and the building floor leve'l was six and 
one half inches above the second step. (R. 21, 80, 
81, 82). Exhibits P-1, 2, 3 and 4 show the general 
nature of the steps and area. 
Plaintiff contended there was a rock on the 
first step and that he stepped on the rock while 
leaving the building with the second bag of cement, 
and it caused him to fall. Although plaintiff con-
tended that the rock was on the first step, he testi-
fied on cross examination and at deposition, that 
he had taken but one step down from the building 
floor level when he fel'l - that he fell as he stepped 
down from the flool' level. (R. 36, 65, 68, 73). The 
rock was about the size of a quarter and he observed 
it on the first step aiter the fall. He never observed 
any rocks or gravel on the steps the first and second 
time he entered the building, or the first time he 
left the building with the cement. (R. 66, 72, 74). 
The rock on the step, alleged by plaintiff, was 
larger than the gravel on the ground and on the 
cement apron in front of the steps. (R. 38, 72). 
There is no evidence in the record as to whether 
the rock which caused p'laintiff to fall was of the 
same type and nature of material as the gravel 
fill, the only evidence being that it was larger than 
any of 'the other gravel material in the area in 
front of the store and on the cement apron. (R. 
38-72). 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY IN INSTRUCTION NO. ll~A. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY IN INSTRUCTION KO. 11-A. 
Plaintiff admits that the instruction given by 
the court is a correct instruction as to the elements 
necessary to hold a possessor of property liable to 
a guest or business visitor, but contends that this 
case is an exception to the rule of law set forth in 
the instruction. Plaintiff makes the bald statement 
that the mere fact 'that the defendants had put some 
gravel on the ground in front of the p1ace of busi-
ness created a dangerous condition, intentionally 
and voluntarily. 
Reading of the plaintiff's brief fails to reveal 
any case, text book aUthority or any valid argument 
that pea gravel spread upon the ground creates 
and makes a dangerous condition. It is common 
knowledge that driveways, road shoulders, play-
grounds and areas in front of buildings, schools, 
service stations and other places too numerous to 
mention, are graveled, to keep them from being 
muddy, dusty or rutted. 
From the undisputed facts, the al'leged rock 
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on the step was larger than the gravel in front of 
the building. There is no evidence in 'this record 
that the rock allegedly on the step was of the same 
or similar size, color or nature as the pea gravel 
on the ground in front of the building. 
The rock was on a step - not on the apron -
not on the ground. The defendants did not gravel the 
steps, did not put :rock or gravel on the steps. The 
rock, even if it had of been placed in the area 
graveled, could not have jumped, flown, or moved 
in any way onto 'the step, be it the first or second 
step above the cement apron. 
Plaintiff Claims comfort from the decision of 
this court in the case of DeWeese v. J. C. Penney 
Company, 5 Utah 2nd 116; 297 P. 2d 898, contend-
ing 'that the case now before the court is within the 
principle announced in the quoted case. The opinion 
of Chief Justice Crockett sets forth the fundamental 
rule of law applicable, and the opinion states: 
"(b) Defendant's negligence. 
"The essential inquiry relating to defendant's 
negligence is \Vhether in performing its duty 
of due care just recited, it knew or sMuld 
have known, that a dangerous condition ex-
isted and whether sufficient time elapsed 
thereafter that, in due care, it should have 
put out the mats or sprink1ed feldspar on the 
surface to reduce the slipperiness." (emphasis 
ours) 
In the very case plaintiff quotes, and in which 
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he claims to find succor, the court announces that 
the essential inquiry relating to defendant's negli~ 
gence is whether in performing its duty of due care 
just recited, IT KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE 
KNOWN that a dangerous condition existed. 
Judge Faux, in instructing the jury, Instruc~ 
tion 11 A, submitted that essential inquiry to the 
jury for determination, did the defendants kno·w, or 
shMtld they have known, that a danger<ntB condition 
existed. The portion of the instruction of which 
plaintiff complains was correctly given, and was a 
correct and essential part of the ins'tt·uction. 
In the DeWeese v. J. C. Penney Co. case, it 
was admitted that the company knew the 'terrazzo 
was slippery when wet, and on 'the day of that 
accident the terrazzo was wet, and therefore the 
elements in the case as to the dangerous condition, 
wet terrazzo, was known to the defendant, and thus 
that defendant did know of the dangerous condi~ 
tion. 
In the case now before the court, there is no 
evidence that defendants knew of the rock being 
on the step, or that any rock had ever been on the 
steps. The court correctly submitted to 'the jury the 
question as to whether the defendants knew or 
should have known the rock was on the step. 
Defendants respectfully submit that this case 
is more within the principle ennunciated by the 
court in the case of Maxine D. !Andl'lay v. Eccles 
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Hotel Company, 3 Utah 2d 364; 284 P. 2d 477. In 
that case the plaintiff slipped and fell on some water 
on the floor in the Coffee Shop of the Eccles Hotel. 
The wai'tress had delivered some water to the plain-
tiff but there was no evidence as to how the water 
got on the floor, by whom it was deposited, when 
it got there, or that defendant had any knowledge 
of its pl'esence, and the court, in upholding the trial 
court's directing a verdict in favor of the defendant, 
said, that under such circumstances, a jury cannot 
be permitted to speculate that the defendant was 
negligent. 
Defendant t'espectfully represents to the court 
that the l'ecord in this case is barren of any evidence 
as to how the rock got on the step, by whom it was 
deposited, when it got on the steps, or that defen-
dants had knowledge of its presence. 
Defendants contend that the circumstances of 
the rock being on the step are equa1ly consistent 
with non-negligence as with negligence, and under 
the doctrine announced in the cases of Jackson v. 
Colston, 116 Utah 295; 209 P. ~d 566; JenMn v. 
S. H. K1·ess Company, 87 Utah -J34; 49 P. 2d 958; 
and Qt•i!ln \'. Ptnh Gas and Coke Company, 42 "Ctah 
113; 129 p 362. 
In the case of Hat::.:is v. l'nitcd States Fuel 
Compony, 21 P. 2rl 862, 82 Utah 38, a case involv-
ing dynamite caps in a house leased by defendant to 
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the plaintiffs, and the son of the plaintiff finding 
the caps and suffering injury, the court said that 
there being no evidence in the record proving or 
tending to prove that the defendant either stmed 
the caps in the place or knew that they were there, 
that the evidence was not sufficient to make the 
defendant liable for the injury. 
Plaintiff quotes to the court the case of Falcone1· 
v. Safeu:ay Stores Inc., 49 W. 2d. 78; 303 P. 2d 294, 
but defendants submit that the case is not applicable. 
In that case the defendants knew of the suet on the 
sidewalk, and had actually placed it there. The 
defendants knew of the suet being on the sidewalk, 
admi'tted1y having put it there, and so the question 
as to whether the defendants knew or should have 
known of its existence on the sidewalk would not 
be proper for a jury, it being an undisputed fact 
in the case. 
In this case now before the court there is no 
fact or admission that the rock was placed on the 
step by defendants, no evidence of how it got there, 
when i't got there, who put it there, or that defen~ 
dants had or should have had knowledge of its 
presence. It did not fly up onto the step. It could 
not get on the step unless someone put it there. It 
could not jump up from the gravel on the ground 
in front of the building. There is no evidence that 
it was of the same type and nature as the pea gravel 
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put in front of the bui'lding, and it was larger than 
any of the pea gravel on the apron and in the area 
in front of the store. 
Defendants respectfully contend that 'the court 
did not err to prejudice the plaintiff, and that 'the 
instruction as given was correct insofar as plaintiff 
is concerned, and plaintiff should not be granted a 
new trial; he had his day in court, and had a fair, 
impartial trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants respectfully represent that the 
trial court shou'ld no't be reversed and no new trial 
ordered. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON, BALDWIN & ALLEN 
BY--------------------------------------------------------
ERNEST F. BALDWIN, JR. 
Attorneys for Responilents 
515 Keams Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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